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NOTES
The Commerce Clause as a Limitation on State TaxationMultiple Burden
Another stage in the recent tendency to require interstate commerce
to pay its own way has apparently been ended in the case of Southern
Pacific Co. v. Gallagher' recently handed down by the Supreme Court.
I. 59 Sup. Ct. 389 (1939).

(712)

NOTES

Similar in many ways to Henneford v. Silas Mason Co. 2 decided by the
Court two years ago, the Southern Pacific case deals with the validity of
had
the California Use Tax 3 as affecting interstate commerce. The state
4
The
Tax.
Sales
Retail
California
to
the
complementary
tax
a
use
levied
use tax applies to tangibles brought in from outside the state and thus not
subject to the sales tax. The tax in dispute had been imposed upon railroad supplies brought into California by the Southern Pacific Co. These
supplies were to be used in interstate commerce; some were to remain
permanently within the state while others were to be affixed to rolling stock.
The Court, basing its decision on the ground that the supplies in question
had passed out of interstate commerce and had become intermingled with
the general property of the state for a taxable moment before reentering
their interstate function, concluded that the tax did not constitute 5a direct
burden upon interstate commerce and was therefore constitutional.
In the Silas Mason case a similar type of tax had been sustained, but
the state statute imposing the tax provided for a credit 1 for the amount of
the sales tax paid to the state wherein the goods had been purchased.
Whether or not the tax would have been valid without this compensatory
provision the Court did not decide.7 The California statute, however, contained no such provision. In the Silas Mason case the Court assumed that
because of the presence of this stipulation the petitioner could not have paid
twice, and therefore that it was not necessary to decide whether judicial
notice should be taken of the existnce of a sales tax in another state or
whether the petitioner must present evidence that he has already paid such
a sales tax. However, it was definitely decided in the Southern Pacific case
that the Court would not even consider the constitutional effect of imposing
this type of double taxation until such evidence had been presented.
In neither of these cases did the Court discuss the question of multiple
burden as being applicable, although in several recent cases the "risk of
multiple burden" has been regarded as the principal objection to taxes of a
similar type. By this view, the immunity from taxation under the commerce clause 8 would apparently be restricted to situations where to allow
multiple or cumulative
the interstate activity to be taxed would result in
9
burdens. In Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford and in Adams Mfg. Co.
v. Storen "othe Court refused to sustain a privilege tax measured by gross
2. 300 U. S. 577 (1937).

3.

CAL. CODES AND

GEN. LA-vs (Deering, Supp. 1935) act 8495a.

4. CAL. CODES Am GEN. LAws (Deering, Supp. 1933) act 8493, as amended, CAL.

CODES AND GaN. LAvs (Deering, Supp. 1935) act 8493. The policy of the tax was to
protect California merchants from the competition of goods purchased in outside states
having no sales tax at all or one lower than the California tax, the goods having subsequently been brought into California for use in that state.
5. The Court relied chiefly on Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249
(1933), where a privilege tax was laid on the selling, storing or distributing gasoline.
The tax sustained was levied on gasoline brought into the state to be stored preliminary
to its use in interstate commerce. This case discredited Helson and Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U. S. 245 (1929), where the Court condemned a privilege tax on the use of
gasoline in propelling an interstate ferry. To tax the consumption of the gas was considered tantamount to taxing the operation of the ferry boat, and therefore incompatible
with the commerce clause. Cf. Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U. S. 504 (1913). See also Champlain Realty Co. v. Brattleboro, 26o U. S. 366 (1922), to the effect that property in
actual continuous transit in interstate commerce is immune from state taxation. If
there are interruptions which are only to promote the safe or convenient transit, then
the continuity of the interstate trip is not broken.
6. Wash. Laws (1935) c. i8o, § 31 et seq.
7. 300 U. S. 577 at 587 (1937).
8. U. S. CoNsT. Art. i, § 8.

9. 59 Sup. Ct 325 (1939).
10. 304 U. S. 307 (1938).
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receipts, a large part of which were derived from interstate transactions.
In the Gwin case the State of Washington had levied an excise tax 11 on
the privilege of transacting business within its borders, such tax to be measured by the gross receipts. The tax fell on the petitioner, a wholesale
fruit dealer, whose products were sold largely outside the state. Since a
similar tax ' 2 might be imposed by the buyer state, it was concluded that
to allow the tax exacted by the seller state would result in exposing interstate sales to the burden of multistate taxation. 13
In Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, the petitioner was engaged in the manufacture of road machinery and equipment, having its principal place of
business in Indiana, and selling 8o per cent. of its machinery to customers in other states and foreign countries. The State of Indiana levied
a tax upon its gross receipts 34 including, without apportionment, receipts
derived from activities in interstate commerce. The Court refused to sustain the tax on the ground that "if lawful it may in substance be laid to
the fullest extent by States in which the goods are sold as well as those in
which they are manufactured", 5 thereby exposing such interstate transactions to the risk of multiple burden. Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in
part, contended that such a gross receipts tax imposed by the seller state
should be sustained unless the petitioner actually proves that the tax would
result in imposing an unfair burden ;16 in effect, until he shows that the
interstate transaction has already been taxed by the buyer state. By this
view mere exposure to the risk of multiple burden would not be sufficient
to sustain the immunity.
Multiple burden was also discussed in Coverdale v. Pipe Line Co."
decided by the Court two years ago. The tax in question was on the
privilege of generating or selling electricity in Louisiana. The petitioner
was in the business of transmitting natural gas interstate, and the tax applied to an engine generating the power necessary to produce sufficient pressure to send the gas long distances through the pipe line. The Court here
sustained the tax on the theory that even though each state through which
the pipe line passes could lay a tax on the engines producing the power,
this would not be multiple burden merely because interstate commerce was
engaged in. If a line lying wholly within the state was of sufficient length
to require another engine to help propel the gas, certainly there would be
no objection to a Louisiana tax on this additional engine. Therefore a tax
imposed by other states through which the pipe line runs would not constitute multiple burden. As the Court says, "It is length of line, not interstate commerce which makes another tax possible".' s
ii. Wash. Laws (1935) c. 18o, §§4 (e), 5 (g).
12. Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, contended that the mere exposure to multiple

burden should not be sufficient to sustain the immunity. 59 Sup. Ct. 325, 330 (1939) :
"So here, if national regulation to prevent 'multiple taxation' is within the constitutional power of this Court, it would seem to be time enough to consider it when appellant or some other taxpayer is actually msbjected to 'multiple taxation'." (Italics supplied.)
13. The Court intimates that if the tax were apportioned to the company's activities within the state it would not then be considered a burden to interstate commerce.
59 Sup. Ct. 325, 328 (1939). Cf. Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 142 U. S. 217 (891) ;
Ficklen v. Shelby County Taxing District, 145 U. S. 1 (1892) ; Underwood Typewriter
Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113 (192o).
14. Indiana Acts (1933) c. 50.
15. 304 U. S. 307, 311 (1937).
16. 304 U. S. 307, 332 (1937).
17. 303 U.S. 604 (1937).
I8. 303 U. S. 604, 613 (937).

NOTES

From all this it is possible to suggest that in sustaining the tax in the
Southern Pacific case, the Court has abandoned the multiple burden test. 9
Certainly the interstate transaction in that case was no less exposed to
multiple burden 20 than the transactions in the Gwin and Storen cases
where the Court sustained immunity on that very ground. 21 It was quite
possible that the state of origin had already imposed a sales tax on the railroad supplies in question, and that by allowing California to apply its use
tax, the transaction was exposed to double taxation "merely because interstate commerce was being done". 22 In the Gwin and Storen cases mere
exposure to the risk of multiple burden was sufficient to invoke the immunity. Under the Southern Pacific rule exposure to such risk is apparently not enough. The petitioner must show that he has paid in the
state of origin, making the rule very much like that proposed by Mr. Justice Black's dissent in the Storen and Gwin cases. However, even after
such evidence is presented the immunity is not certain. Whether the second tax would then be sustained is a matter left open by the decision. 2'
It would seem that these distinctions by which the Court is gradually
broadening the field of operation of state taxation probably grow from the
feeling of the Court that we are faced with a new economic and political
situation which demands a revision of older concepts. Historically, the
immunity of interstate commerce from state taxation grew out of the political necessity of removing the barriers raised by the states to national
unity. The commerce clause in the Federal Constitution was framed to
prevent the political chaos existing under the Articles of Confederation.
Economically, too, the Court was moved perhaps subconsciously to favor
the growth of trade beyond the confines of single states. Both these purposes have been accomplished-and a new era brings a new problem, the
great extension of the services of the state. Widespread activities in new
19. It is reasonably apparent that multiple burden in the sense that the Court uses
it is confined solely to the sales tax, both on price and gross receipts, and its corollary
the use tax. The fact that one state outstrips another in the number of other types of
tax it may impose on a particular article in the various stages of its manufacture, and
consequently that such an article when shipped to another state for sale is at a
disadvantage with goods produced locally, has never been regarded as objectionable.
See Lockhart, The Sales Tax in Interstate Commerce (1939) 52 HAxv. L. Ray. 617,
626; Note (1939) 52 HARv. L. REv. 502, 5o8.
2o. Although multiple burden is a recently developed distinction, it seems that it
would have applied in such cases as Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123 (U. S. 1868)
and Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U. S. 5o6 (1923). In these cases the Court sustained the sales tax imposed by the state into which the goods had been shipped and
sold. It would seem that here the state of origin could have imposed a use tax, or a tax
on the gross receipts, the taxable event being the presence of the goods in the state of
origin prior to interstate shipment Within the test of the recent cases this would seem
to be multiple burden.
21. In Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250 (1938), the Court
sustained a privilege tax measured by the gross receipts partly derived from the
interstate sale of advertising space in a magazine. Here the Court concluded that
there was no risk of multiple burden, although it seems that the buyer state might also
be able to impose a tax on the sale if it were made within its borders, thus subjecting the
interstate transaction to double taxation merely because interstate commerce was being
done. Another possibility of subjecting the transaction in this case to multiple burden
is suggested in Note (1939) 52 HARv. L. REV. 502, 504.
22. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 255 (1938).
23. Nor is the fact that there were two taxable events in the Southern Pacific case
helpful in reconciling the result with the Gwin and Storen cases. In the first decision
the taxable events were the sale in the state of origin and the subsequent use in California. However, two taxable events were present in the Gwin and Storen decisions; in
the former, the privilege of engaging in business activities in Washington and the sale
in the buyer state; and in the latter, the receipt of gross income, and the sale in the
buyer state.
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fields, and expansion of orbits which previously circumscribed state action,
have drained treasuries which cannot easily be filled when a greater and
greater part of its business and wealth is engaged in pursuits overrunning
its borders and consequently claiming immunities under the commerce
clause.
Thus the Court has been forced to reexamine the immunity doctrine,
and to extend the scope of the state's taxing power where no valid reason
for the immunity exists. One of the results of that reexamination is the
group of cases discussed above.
I. K. G.

Judicial Review of Orders of the National Labor Relations Board
The provision in the National Labor Relations Act' for judicial review 2 of orders of the National Labor Relations Board is another manifestation of the general faith in the competency of the courts to decide the
legal rights of parties, 8 and at the same time perhaps evidence of a hesitancy to allow the administrative to go completely unchecked. Since the
National Labor Relations Board, like most administratives, cuts a wide
swath across the field of social relationships and must encounter conflicting social forces at every turn, the role of the judiciary as the final arbiter
is extremely important. Of primary concern here are the extent to which
the judiciary has seen fit to check the Board, and the scope of Board powers
recognized by the courts.
The National Labor Relations Board is not a radically novel body,
but has its procedural counterpart in the methods of the Federal Trade
Commission, 4 and deals with a body of law inherited in some respects from
the Railway Labor Act.5 The review of National Labor Relations Board
orders, as with those of the Federal Trade Commission, is the province of
the circuit court of appeals, either upon petition by the Board for enforcement of its order 6 or upon petition for a court review of the order by an
aggrieved person. 7 That the Board must depend greatly on the courts
follows from the fact that its orders have no legal effect except where the
courts grant a decree enforcing the order. This means, therefore, that
whenever an employer chooses to disregard a Board order the court must
review the case before the Board's action can have any force. The result
has been a disproportionately large body of decisions rendered under the
statute.8
I. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 151 et seq. (Supp. 1938).
2. 49 STAT. 455 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § i6o (f) (Supp. 1938).
3. LANDIS, THE AD INISTRATIvE PROCESS (1938) 152, 154.

4. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 38

(1934).

STAT. 720

(1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 45

5. See Byrer, The Railway Labor Act and the National Labor Relations Act-A
Comparison (937) 44 W. VA. L. Q. i; Note (1938) 36 MIcH. L. REv. 1132.
6. 49 STAT. 454 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § i6o (e) (Supp. 1938).
7. 49 STAT. 455 (I935), 29 U. S. C. A. § i6o (f) (Supp. 1938).
8. See 3 L. R. REP. 6o7 (1939)

and cases collected in 2 L. R. REP. 495 (1938), 3

L. R. REP. 114 (1938). In addition to these cases reviewing Board orders, the courts
have had to rule on ninety-five suits to enjoin the Board or its officers, and of these,
but three, all in the first circuit, have granted restraining decrees. Since the Supreme
Court has held that the procedure for reviewing the Board's actions sufficiently protects
the constitutional rights of employers, this fertile source of litigation has been eradicated. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41 (1938) ; Newport News
Shipbuilding Co. v. Schauffler, 303 U. S. 54 (1938), both cases noted in 86 U. oF PA. L.
Ry. 541.

NOTES

In general, judicial review 9 is an investigation first of whether or not
the administrative had jurisdiction over the case, and secondly, assuming
authority, whether or not the facts found by the board were supported
by evidence. 10 Inroads have been made on the independence of administratives by such legalisms as "jurisdictional" and "constitutional fact","and also by carrying over from the common law nisi prius procedure the
theory of the division between the function of judge and jury as to control
over the facts and matters of law. Since the power of the administrative
to act is delimited by the enabling statute, and all orders are open to attack
if the jurisdiction of the board is put in question,' 2 it seems desirable first
to consider how National Labor Relations Board orders have fared where
the Board's jurisdiction has been subjected to test.
DOCTRINE OF JURISDICTIONAL FACT AS APPLIED To NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS BOARD ORDERS
Briefly, the jurisdiction of the Board revolves about unfair labor prac-

tices "affecting commerce",' 3 the latter being defined to mean ".

..

bur-

dening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce." 1" Clearly,
this is a broad grant of power, even though necessarily confined to the flow
of goods in interstate commerce. And the Supreme Court, in reviewing
Board orders, has uniformly given full effect to the Act, broad though it
may be.' 5 Moreover, it should be added that in so doing the Court has
turned aside from its previous decisions relating to the nature of interstate
commerce, and blazed a trail that goes further than any plotted out by
the Court in its long line of decisions on the commerce power.' 6 Recognizing the inadvisability of attempting to mark out a definite field of operation for the Board, the Court has stated that the "authority conferred
upon the Board is left by the statute to be determined as individual cases
arise." '7
A number of the cases challenging the jurisdiction of the Board have
come before the Supreme Court, and the opinions delivered on this par-

9. The field of administrative law is overrun with discussions of the scope of
judicial review. See the numerous references cited in Black, The "JurisdictionalFact"
Theory and Administrative Finality (1937) 22 CORN. L. Q. 349, 515.
io. DIcKINSON, ADMINISTRATrVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW (1927)

50.

ii. Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson: Judicial Review of Administrative Determination of Questions of "ConstitutionalFact" (1932) 8o U. OF PA. L. REv. Io55.
12. See Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 289 (I920);
St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 52 (1936) ; N. L. R. B. v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 3O U. S. 1, 47 (i937), 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 733. Ad-

ministrative findings are not final even though supported by substantial evidence if the
facts are jurisdictional or affect constitutional rights. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22
(1932).

13. 49 STAT. 453 (935), 29 U. S. C. A. § i60 (a) (Supp. 1938).
14. 49 STAT. 450 (935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 152 (7) (Supp. 1938).
15. N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 3oi U. S. I (937) ; N. L. R. B.
v. Freuhauf Trailer Co., 301 U. S. 49 (937) ; N. L. R. B. v. Friedman-Harry Marks
Clothing Co., 301 U. S. 58 (1937); Associated Press v. N. L. R. B., 301 U. S. 103

(1937); Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v. N. L. R. B., 3oi U. S. i42
0937) ; Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. N. L. R. B., 303 U. S. 453 (1938) ; Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 59 Sup. Ct. 206 (1938).
16. Donoho, Jurisdictionof the National Labor Relations Board-The Developing
Cdoncept of Interstate Commerce (1938) 6 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 436; Fraenkel, Constitutional Issues in the Supreme Court, x936 Term (1937) 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 38, 42;
Frankfurter and Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court at the October Terms, 1935
and 1936 (938) 5I HARv. L. REv. 577, 637.
17. N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 32 (1937); see

Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. N. L. R B., 303 U. S. 453, 467 (1938) ; Consolidated
Edison Co. v. N. L. M. B., 59 Sup. Ct. 2o6, 214 (1938).
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ticular phase of the Act have shown a cleavage in the Court, the converse
of that occurring in the series of cases following immediately after Schechter
v. United States.'s The present majority 19 is inclined to a broader construction of the commerce power. Where the Court has had to decide
whether the Board had jurisdiction to issue an order to an employer, it has
been confronted, however, with a minority that persists in evoking the0
principles laid down in the Schechter case and Carter v. Carter Coal Co.2
As each case must be decided on its facts, there is opportunity for differences of interpretation among the various circuit courts of appeals. In
point are the opinions of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 21 and of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,22' reviewing an order of the Board involving a mining company. The former court
upheld the Board's jurisdiction, finding that an employer who sells the
bulk of his commodity f. o. b. the mine to a national sales company outside
the state comes under the statute. The court in the ninth circuit, on the
other hand, found that a gold and silver mining company selling to the
Government mint located within the state was not subject to an order of
the Board, since it was not engaged in interstate commerce. In deciding
the latter case, it is notable that the court did not consider the Cartercase 28
in reaching its decision. It merely distinguished the case at bar from the
cases arising under the Act advanced as authority for the Board's order.
Yet, on the basis of the Supreme Court decisions, the ninth circuit court
could have upheld the order, for "although activities may be intrastate
in character when separately considered, if they have such a close and
substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or
appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control." 24 The coal
mining case appears to be a stronger one for a finding of jurisdiction, but
as the Supreme Court has succinctly stated, "The question is necessarily
one of degree." 25
In the main, the emphasis on the jurisdictional issue is beginning to
fade. The uniform success enjoyed by the National Labor Relations Board
before the courts on that phase of the Act has begun to have its effect, and
the far-reaching opinions in Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. N. L. R. B.2 8
and Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B.2 7 bid fair to foreclose extensive litigation on the jurisdictional point.
18. 295 U. S. 495 (935) ; United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. r (1936) ; Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936).
ig. The first group of Labor Board cases handed down by the Court in its October
term, 1936, found the Justices aligned five against four. The majority was composed
of Chief Justice Hughes, and Justices Brandeis, Stone, Roberts, and Cardozo. The
minority, which in the Schechter case had made up the bulk of the deciding Justices,
consisted of Justices McReynolds, Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler. In the more
recent cases reviewing Board orders, the dissenting opinions have been the work of
Justices Butler and McReynolds, while Justices Reed and Black have sided with the
majority.
2o. See dissenting opinions in cases cited supra note 15.
21. Clover Fork Coal Co. v. N. L. R. B., 97 F. (2d) 331 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938).
22. N. L. R. B. v. Idaho-Maryland Mines Corp., 98 F. (2d) 129 (C. C. A. 9th,
1938).
23. 298 U. S. 238 (1936).
24. N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. I, 37 (1937).

Ibid.
26. 303 U. S.453 (1938).
27. 59 Sup. Ct. 2o6 (1938), 87 U.
25.

OF PA.

L. REv. 480

(1939).

NOTES
REVIEW OF FINDINGS OF FACT

One of the primary functions of the administrative is fact finding, a
sphere of quasi-judicial activity which occasions much of the adverse
criticism directed against such bodies. That the same governmental organ
should have the power to determine the facts of the cases which it .is called
upon to decide has long been objected to by the opponents of administrative boards. 28 The capacity to find the facts can become the capacity to
reach a conclusion. 29 Those who have fought the National Labor Relations Board have seized upon this as an argument in the movement to bring
about revision of the Act.3 0 But the finality of the facts found by administratives has long been upheld by the courts where upon review it has
been found that there was substantial evidence to sustain the findings.3 '
This well-established rule has been reiterated in all the cases where the
courts have reviewed orders of the National Labor Relations Board, objected to on the score that the Board's findings were faulty.32 For the
most part, it may be said that the orders of the Board upon review have
33
not been reversed for lack of substantial evidence to support the findings
which were taken as the basis for the order.
28. Maladministration of the Act has been criticized in Gall and Smethurst, Amending the Wagner Act: The Problem from the Manufacturer's Viewpoint (1938) 5 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 306, 316.
29. Rosenberry, Power of the Courts to Set Aside Administrative Rules and Orders (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 279, 333.

3o. The alleged one-sidedness of the National Labor Relations Act has led to a
concerted drive for the amendment of the Act. A comprehensive summary of the various plans of revision is to be found in Gall and Smethurst, Amending the Wagner Act:
The Problem from the Manufacturer's Viewpoint (1938)

306.

5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.

See also the American Federation of Labor criticisms and proposals in Green,
Labor Board vs. Labor Act (1939) ig FORTUNE, No. 2, p. 79.
31. "In the case of statutory provisions like § io (e), applicable to other administrative tribunals, we have refused to review the evidence or weigh the testimony and
have declared we will reverse or modify the findings only if clearly improper or not supported by substantial evidence." Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v. N. L.
R. B., 3O U. S. 142, 147 (1937).

32. Perhaps the fullest statement of the concept of "substantial evidence" as employed in the standard of finality has been made in N. L. R. B. v. Thompson Products
Co., 97 F. (2d) 13, 15 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938): "'Substantial evidence' means more than
a mere scintilla. It is of substantial and relevant consequence and excludes vague, uncertain, or irrelevant matter. It implies a quality of proof which induces conviction and
makes an impression on reason. It means that one weighing the evidence takes into consideration all the facts presented to him and all reasonable inferences, deductions and
conclusions to be drawn therefrom and, considering them in their entirety and relation
to each other, arrives at a fixed conviction." "Substantial" has thus been grafted on to
the word "evidence" in an effort to exact greater care from the administrative in its
task of fact finding. The Wagner Act includes a customary prescription "That the
findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence shall be conclusive." 49
STAT. 454 (935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 16o (e) (Supp. 1938).
33. N. L. R. B. v. Wallace Mfg. Co., 95 F. (2d) 818 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938); N. L.
R. B. v. Freezer & Son, Inc., 95 F. (2d) 84o (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) ; N. L. R. B. v. Oregon Worsted Co., 96 F. (2d) 193 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938); Clover Fork Coal Co. v. N. L.
R. B., 97 F. (2d) 331 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938); N. L. R. B. v. Biles Coleman Lumber Co.,
98 F. (2d) 18 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938) ; N. L. R. B. v. Kentucky Firebrick Co., 99 F. (2d)
89 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938). See also cases cited supra note 15.
However, the more recent decisions appear to be more stringent, and the courts
have reversed the Board in the following cases because the findings were without substantial foundation: N. L. R. B. v. Thompson Products Co., 97 F. (2d) 13 (C. C. A.
6th, 1938) ; N. L. R. B. v. Lion Shoe Co., 97 F. (2d) 448 (C. C. A. Ist, 1938) ; Standard Lime and Stove Co. v. N. L. R. B., 97 F. (2d) 531 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) ; BallstonStillwater Knitting Co. v. N. L. R. B., 98 F. (2d) 758 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938). Modification of the order because of defective findings was decreed in N. L. R. B. v. Abell &
Co., 97 F. (2d) 9si (C. C. A. 4 th, 1938); N. L. R. B. v. Union Pacific Stages Co., 99
F. (2d) 153 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
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Of course, there can be no definitive rule to follow in the consideration of what constitutes substantial evidence and no certainty as to when
the facts as found may survive judicial review. 4 Several dissenting opinions have accordingly been written resting partially on an inability to see
eye to eye with the majority on the propriety of the facts found.35 In a
few instances, the Board has been called to task for making findings which,
in the opinion of the court, were not supported by substantial evidence, and
where therefore the order of the Board has not been enforced. Thus, in
Ballston-StillwaterKnitting Company, Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 8 the court set
aside completely an order of the Board upon review, concluding that there
was no substantial evidence to support the five findings of the Board that
the employer (i) had locked out his employees to discourage collective
bargaining, (2) had dominated and interfered with the formation and administration of a union, (3) and (4) had laid off employees at two different plants in order to discourage membership in the outside union, and (5)
that a strike in progress at the time of the hearings was caused by petitioner's discriminatory practices. The court could see no basis in the
evidence for these findings; on the contrary, the evidence disclosed the
employer had been willing to bargain collectively and that counsel for the
Board had conceded there was no lockout. Apparently, the Board was
indulging in an abundance of speculation as to the activities of the employer. The opinion reveals that the Board had been overzealous in its
endeavor to help the employees and failed to take heed of the fact that the
court is not "bound to accept findings based on evidence which merely
creates a suspicion or gives rise to an inference that cannot reasonably be
accepted." 31
Among the many circuit court opinions 38 concerned with the evidence upon which the Board has rested its findings of fact, that of the
court in N. L. R. B. v. Thompson Products Company 89 is outstanding.
This case is especially pertinent because the employer argued his crosspetition for review solely upon the ground that there was no substantial
evidence to support the finding of the Board or its order. The holding of
the case has been incorporated into a ruling of the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit 40 which, in the course of a long opinion reviewing
the order of the Board, exhibited displeasure with the methods of the
administrative. The alleged prejudice of the Board in favor of employees
34. But in Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 96
F. (2d) 554, 559 (C. C. A. D. C. 1938), 27 GEo. L. J. 87, the court attempts the unprecedented and goes so far as to lay down rules for the process of fact finding: "(i)
evidence must be taken and weighed, both as to its accuracy and credulity; (2) from
attentive consideration of this evidence a determination of facts of a basic or underlying
nature must be reached; (3) from these basic facts the ultimate facts usually in the
language of the statute, are to be inferred, or not, as the case may be; (4) from this
finding the decision will follow by the application of the statutory criterion."
35. N. L. R. B. v. Delaware-New Jersey Ferry Co., 9o F. (2d) 52o (C. C. A. 3d,
1937) (dissent approved Board's finding of authorized collective bargaining agent),
cert. denied, 302 U. S. 738 (1937); Jeffery-De Witt Insulator Co. v. N. L. R. B., gi F.
(2d) 134, 140 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937) (differing on a finding that a labor dispute existed),
cert. denied, 302 U. S.731 (1937); N. L. R. B. v. Thompson Products Co., 97 F. (2d)
13, 17 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938) (dissent affirmed in part Board's finding of discharge for
union activities).
36. 98 F. (2d) 758 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
37. Id. at 76o.
38. See cases cited supra note 33.
39. 97 F. (2d) 13 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938).
40. See N. L. R. B. v. Union Pacific Stages Co., 99 F. (2d) 153, 177 (C. C. A. gth,
1938).
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was in this instance found to be a factor in the decision, and the court was
not slow to call attention to the "distorted
picture" of the employer's activ41
ities as presented by the Board.
Whereas of late the courts have had to concern themselves less with
the issue of jurisdiction than heretofore, there is a corresponding increase
in the cases challenging the Board's findings. And though the law on
administrative findings is well settled, the courts have had to restate it in
the various cases reviewing Board orders. Mr. Justice Stone, in N. L.
R. B. v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co.,4 2 delivered the latest Supreme Court statement of the nature of the evidence necessary to support
Board findings. In effect, the opinion is simply a reaffirmation of principles previously expressed, 43 with an emphatic reminder to the Board
that "substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla and must do more
than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established". The
reversals
suffered by the Board here and in N. L. R. B. v. Sands Mfg.
Co. 44 are the first wherein the Supreme Court has ruled all the facts as
found to be without support of substantial evidence. In the Columbian
case the Court went further than the circuit court in reversing a finding
that an employer refused to bargain collectively with the union where a
third party, here a Labor Department conciliator, and not the employees,
sought to bargain. Significant as the decision may be as a rebuff to the
Board, the majority and dissenting opinions, taken together, focus on the
vital issue-the scope of judicial review of commission orders. Mr. Justice Black, dissenting 45 for himself and Mr. Justice Reed, took up the
cause of commission government and warned that decisions like the instant
one thwarted the effectiveness of administrative bodies established to expedite governmental functions. As stated in the dissent: "Courts should
not-as here-substitute their appraisal of the evidence for that of the

Board."

46

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: REVIEW OF ORDERs REQUIRING

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
(a) Power to "Disestablish" Company Unions
It is not difficult to apprehend that a negative order can be used to
achieve the same end arrived at by one calling for affirmative action.47 The
National Labor Relations Act does include several provisions which allow
the Board to order an employer to act, rather than to refrain from acting,
such as the reinstatement of employees and the requirement of making
reports as to compliance. 48 But the Act does not make any reference to
41. Id. at 158:

".

.

. the Board relies to a large extent upon what it terms back-

ground. In developing this perspective the ordinary judicial approach to the consideration of evidence is abandoned and a novel method invoked by which statements made
by dissatisfied employees upon their examination in chief are quoted to support some of
the findings of the Board, although in specific instances, this evidence was modified or
eliminated by admissions made on cross-examination. On the other hand, testimony
of Company officials which disputed the charges, even where apparently corroborated,
was invariably disregarded wherever there was a conflict in the evidence."
42. 59 Sup. Ct. 501 (1939).
43. See cases cited supra notes 15 and 33.
44. 59 Sup. Ct. 5o8 (1939).

45. N. L. R. B. v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 59 Sup. Ct. 501, 505
(1939).

46. Ibid.

47. See Note (1938) 36 MIcH. L. REv. 113, H136.
48. 49 STAT. 454 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § i6o (c) (Supp. 1938). The usual order
calls on the employer to cease and desist from his unfair labor practice and is therefore

injunctive.
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withdrawal of recognition from a union with which the employer has carried on negotiations, nor does it include such language as "disestablishment" as alplied to unions found to be in unholy alliance with the employer.
Thus, in reviewing the first cases wherein the Board ordered withdrawal
of recognition and "disestablishment", the courts faced a problem not expressly provided for in the Act, and one which demanded examination of the
language and policy of the law. However, the cases of first impression did
not uphold the Board in these orders, but maintained that the Board lacked
the necessary authority to make them without a notice to the union itself
and opportunity for a hearing, and without an election by the employees
to choose a labor organization to represent them. 49
Taking both a practical and a sound view of the Act, the Supreme
Court on certiorarigave further strength to it by decreeing enforcement
of the order "disestablishing" company unions in N. L. R. B. v. Pennsyl51
vania Greyhound Lines 50 and in N. L. R. B. v. Pacific Greyhound Lines.
It was comparatively simple for the Court to reach its result since it had
merely to rely once again on the broad language of the Act and this time
pegged the opinions on the phrase permitting the Board "to take such
affirmative action, . . . as will effectuate the policies of this Act." 52 The
Court, however, was not without precedent in its action, for in Texas &
55
IV. 0. R. R. v. Brotherhood of Railway & S. S. Clerks it had upheld an
4
directing the employer to "disestaborder under the Railway Labor Act
lish" a company union. Since the latter statute is recognized as the precursor of the National Labor Relations Act 5 the decision of the Court
appears to be a normal outgrowth of the development of labor relations in
this country.
Although the circuit courts in the Greyhound cases had based their
opinions partly on the fact that the union to be "disestablished" had been
55
given no notice thereof or opportunity of being heard in the proceedings,
the Supreme Court indicated that the "order did not run against the Association" and it was therefore "not entitled to notice and hearing." "
(b) Power to Invalidate a Contract between Employer and Labor Union
As a review of the Board order "to cease and desist from giving effect"
to the petitioner's contracts with the American Federation of Labor local in
Consolidated Edison Co. v. IV. L. R. B.,5 s the Supreme Court opinion is
susceptible of varying interpretations. Here the court found that the contracting union was an independent one, free from control by the employer,
and that the contracts " were fair and salutary. It therefore refused to
49. N. L. R. B. v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 91 F. (2d) 178 (C. C. A. 3d,
1938) (see cogent dissent by Judge Biggs) ; N. L. R. B. v. Pacific Greyhound Lines,
91 F. (2d) 458 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
50. 303 U. S. 261 (1938), rev'g 91 F. (2d) 178 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938).
51. 303 U. S. 272 (938), rev'g 91 F. (2d) 458 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
52. 49 STAT. 454 (935), 29 U. S. C. A. § i6o (c) (Supp. 1938).
53. 281 U. S. 548 (1929).
54. 44 STAT. 577 (1926), 45 U. S. C. A. § 151 et seq. (1934).
55. See H. R. RP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935) 3.
56. See supra note 49.
57. N. L. R. B. v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 3o3 U. S. 261, 271 (1938). It
should be remembered that throughout all the cases where Board orders are reviewed,
it is the Board itself which is the party in the proceedings and not the one pressing the
charges against the employer.
58. 59 Sup. Ct. 2o6 (1938). The decision is a milestone in the history of the National Labor Relations Act, not only for the opinion on the invalidation of contracts, but
also for the extension of the jurisdiction of the Board over public utilities operating
within a state but supplying power to consumers engaged in interstate commerce. See
cases cited supra note 15.
59. For text of the contracts see 3 L. R. REP. 452 (1938).
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apply Section io (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, since, in the
opinion of the majority, to render the agreement void would be a punitive
action and not a remedial one. The Court pointed out that the policy of
the Act is to eliminate obstructions to the free flow of commerce, and that
the setting aside of the contracts would hinder rather than aid the flow of
commerce.
The Court refused to find the parallel between the Consolidated case
and N. L. R. B. v. PennsylvaniaGreyhound Lines6 0 as urged by the Board,
and so determined that in the former case the contracting union was an
indispensable party to the action, 61 notwithstanding that in the Greyhound
case the company union was not held to be a necessary party. The distinction found by the Court was predicated on the fact that in the Greyhound
case the employee organization was a company union, whereas in the case
at hand the union was an independent one, and therefore had "valuable and
beneficial interests in the contracts." But Justices Reed and Black, dissenting from the majority's refusal to set aside the contracts, maintained that
in this case "the unions are affected by the action on the contracts, exactly
as the labor organization in the Greyhound case was affected by the order to
withdraw recognition." 62
A reading of the majority opinion 6 discloses that the validity of the
contracts was not even in issue in this case. Moreover, the Board failed to
allege that the contracts were the result of unfair labor practices of the
employer 6' and it may well be that had this been done and the allegations
proved, the order would have been upheld. 65 As the case actually stood,
the contracting union was viewed by the court as completely independent
and the contracts therefore valid. Whether or not the holding in the Consolidated Edison case simply revolves about this procedural point, or is a
declaration by the Court that Board orders postulated on the broad language
of Section IO will be subjected to stringent review, remains to be seen.
(c) Power to Order Reinstatement
Many of the cases reviewed by the courts involve an order invoking
Section IO(c) empowering the Board to reinstate employees where such
action will effectuate the policies of the Act. Again, judicial sanction for
this grant of authority may be discovered in the Railway Clerks case 66 in
which the Court decreed the restoration to service of employees discharged
in violation of the Railway Labor Act of 1926.67 To the employees
aggrieved by unfair labor practices, this device of reinstatement is extremely
important, particularly so because of the now chronically choked labor market. It is common knowledge that employers have in numerous instances
sought to discourage union activity by discharging those engaged in it.68
6o. 303 U. S. 26r (1938).

6I. Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 59 Sup. Ct. 206, 218 (1938).
62. Id. at 226.
63. Id. at 219.
64. Id. at 220.

65. ". . . the main contention of the Board is that the contracts were the fruit
of the unfair labor practices of the employers; that they were 'simply a device to consummate and perpetuate' the companies' illegal conduct and constituted its culmination. . . . If the Board intended to make that charge, it should have amended its
complaint accordingly, given notice to the Brotherhood, and introduced proof to sustain
the charge." Ibid. See (1939) 25 VA. L. Rzv. 495.
66. Texas & N. 0. R. R. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U. S. 548 (1930).
67. 44 STAT. 577 (1926), 45 U. S. C. A. § 151 et seq. (1934).
68. See facts of cases cited supra note 15. The recognition of such discrimination
was partly instrumental in bringing about the passage of the National Labor Relations
Act, and is given expression in the clause stating the policy of the statute. 49 STAT. 449
(I935), 29 U. S. C. A. § i5i (Supp. 1938).
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Without the ability of the Board to compel the return of these employees
to their jobs, the Act would be much less effective.
The focal point of the courts' consideration of the power to reinstate
has been the problem of whether or not an employer-employee relationship
has existed so as to confer jurisdiction on the Board to make the order.
By Section 2 (3) of the Act the term employee is defined to include ".. .
any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment. . . ." Prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in
N. L. R. B. v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.,69 there was some dispute
in the cases as to the status of employees who had voluntarily left their
employment as the result of a labor dispute. But it is well settled under
the Act that although an employee may have struck, he still retains his
relationship as "employee" toward his employer, 70 and therefore the Board
has jurisdiction to order the reinstatement of striking employees who come
within the scope of Section 2 (3). It is not essential that there should be
some unfair labor practice on the part of the employer which induces the
rupture between the parties; it is enough merely that work ceased "in connection with any current labor dispute". 71 That the unfair labor practice
occurred after work 7 stopped does not preclude the reinstatement of a
"striking employee". 2
A problem arising in connection with the Board's power to reinstate
concerns a situation where the employer has filled the striking worker's
position. If the employer has not been guilty of a violation of the Act, there
can be no order requiring him to discharge the new employee and take back
the old one.73 But where he chooses to continue the relationship between
himself and the striking worker he cannot adopt discriminatory tactics
when rehiring, with a view toward punishing those who have been zealous
in union activity. 74 To do so is to subject himself to an order of reinstatement.
It will be recalled that the language of Section 2 (3), while not couched
in the express words, allows the use of the term "striking employee". But
it also requires that the employee shall not have "obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment. .... " This clause reflects
legislative sagacity for it would be anomalous to consider an employee,
striking against X employer as a "striking employee" after he had been
hired by Y, a competitor, to do substantially similar work. Thus, upon
review, an order of the Board requiring an employer to reinstate men who
had obtained equivalent employment elsewhere was not enforced by the
court which found that such a decree was contrary to the statutory provisions.7 Considering Section 2 (3) in connection with Section IO (c), it
becomes evident that the Board cannot, under the guise of effectuating the
policies of the Act, assume the authority to order reinstated "striking employees" who have obtained other substantially equivalent employment, for,
69. 304 U. S. 333 (1938), rev'g 92 F. (2d) 761 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
70. Jeffery-De Witt Insulator Co. v. N. L. R. B., 91 F. (2d) 134 (C. C. A. 4th,

1937) and cases cited therein; N. L. R. B. v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 94 F. (2d) 138 (C.
C. A. 9th, 1937), cert. denied, 304 U. S. 575 (1938).
71. N. L. R. B. v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U. S. 333, 344 (1938).
72. Id. at 346. See Judge Garrecht's dissent, N. L. R. B. v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 92 F. (2d) 761, 765 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
73. N. L. R. B. v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U. S. 333 (1938) ; cf. N. L.
R. B. v. Bell Oil & Gas Co., 91 F. (2d) 5o9 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937).

74. N. L. R. B. v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U. S. 333 (1938).
75. Mooresville Cotton Mills v. N. L. R. B., 94 F. (2d) 61 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938).
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by definition, the Board lacks jurisdiction over them. At most, the Board
can order the employer who has committed the offense to make whole
employees for that period between the unfair labor practice and the time
equivalent employment was obtained.78 The enforcement of such a decree
by the court is in harmony with the purposes of the Act.
A more complex and troublesome problem is presented where the
"striking employees" display illegal conduct, and the court must decide
whether to enforce the Board's order of reinstatement. While the Board
has decreed the reinstatement of employees guilty of various offenses, the
courts have been loathe to enforce such orders. Thus, in a decision
already characterized as "its most important step to confine commission
government within the bounds of the Constitution" 7 7 the Supreme Court
in N. L. R. B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp.78 dealt with the controversial
issue of the sit-down strike, and denied redress to the strikers. The primary
concern in the case was whether the Board had authority to compel the
reinstatement of employees discharged for taking part in the sit-down strike.
The Board's findings that the company had been engaging in unfair practices in violation of Sections 8 (I), (2), and (5) were sustained by the
entire Court.7 9 Possession of the plant by the strikers took place after the
company had refused to recognize or bargain with the union. Upon refusal to quit the premises, they were discharged, and eventually ejected
forcibly, after service of a writ of attachment for contempt, and one abortive
attempt at eviction. To sustain its order of reinstatement the Board brought
forth three arguments: (i) that the unfair labor practices precipitated the
strike, (2) that despite the discharge for illegal conduct, under the Act
these men were "striking employees", and (3) that reinstatement was
proper in order to "effectuate the policies" of the Act. The Court answered each of these arguments adversely to the Board. The first was
dismissed by pointing out that the employees had their remedy under the
Act, and that the company ought not to be deprived of its rights because
of its own extra-legal conduct. The result reached in dealing with the
second contention of the Board may be of far-reaching consequences, for
here the Court had to construe again the language of Section 2 (3) and
define a "striking employee". In doing so, it repudiated the view that
the legislative intent was to require employers to retain workers despite
their "unlawful conduct". Under this latest interpretation of Section 2 (3)
it appears that the term "striking employee" must be considered to mean
"lawfully striking employee", since to others the Act does not apply. Assuming the correctness of the result, yet the precise import of the term
"unlawful conduct" as used by the Court raises an important new problem.
Does it mean that a court may, in the future, refuse to apply the Act by
holding that discharged employees were participants in an "unlawful
strike"? If so, the ultimate effect of the decision, which dealt only with
the sit-down strike, may be to provide the courts a device wherewith to
render the Act inutile, in a manner perhaps not unlike that adopted by
them in their construction of the anti-injunction provisions of the Clayton Act.
76. Id. at 66.
77. N. Y. Times, March 5, 1939, § 4, P. 3, col. I.
78. 59 Sup. Ct. 490 (1939), aff'g 98 F. (2d) 375 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938).
79. While the lower court had upheld no part of the Board's order, the Supreme
Court decreed that the company withdraw recognition from and "disestablish" Rare
Metal Workers of America, Local No. i, a union formed a month after the company retook possession of the plant, and found by the Board to have been organized in violation
of § 8 (2) of the Act.
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Reverting to the majority opinion in the Consolidated Edison case,
the majority in the Fansteel case answered the Board's third contention by
stressing that the Board's rulings must be remedial and not punitive, and
that the reinstatement of the sit-downers would not "effectuate the policies
of the Act" under Section io (c). According to the Court, to apply that
Section here would be to encourage illegality and violence, and would work
a result in contravention of the statute.
No less significant than the majority opinion, are the implications of
the dissent by Mr. Justice Reed, concurred in by Mr. Justice Black. These
Justices pointed out the difficulty of gauging unlawful activity in the administration of a statute concerned with the interplay of highly volatile
social forces. They would not append any qualifications to the term "striking employee", for in their view, an employee who ceases work in a labor
dispute involving unfair labor practices on the part of the employer should
be released from the employer's right of discharge for that period. As for
"unlawful conduct", they contended that the usual law enforcement machinery is the answer. The important consideration is the preservation of the
employer-employee relation during the period of friction. The minority
would commit the problem of reinstating employees guilty of serious offenses
to the discretion of the Board which should be free from judicial interference. Thus, two Justices are not hesitant to grant the administrative an
almost unchecked power to reinstate employees admittedly guilty of such
misbehavior as occurred here.
The decision in the Fansteel case has had the immediate effect of
prompting employers to discharge sit-down strikers.8 0 However, since the
sit-down is already disappearing as a labor weapon, it is unlikely that the
exact case will recur soon, but the seed sown in it from which complexities
in the administration of the Act may be expected to grow is the term "unlawful" as applied to strikes.
The violation of a contract by "striking employees" has been held to
bar them from the right of reinstatement."' The courts which have so
maintained in their review of the Board order have declared that the abrogation of the contract relationship severs the employer-employee bond,
and as a consequence the Board has no authority to direct reinstatement.2
This was held by the Supreme Court in N. L. R. B. v. Sands Mfg. Co.1
where the employer, under contract with the union, had been found by
the Board to have interfered with and coerced its employees in violation
of Section 8 (I), disobeyed Section 8 (3) by discriminating against certain employees for membership in a union, and refused to bargain collecThe majority upheld the circuit
tively as required by Section 8 (q).
court's reversal of the Board's order of reinstatement on the ground that
the evidence was insufficient to warrant the conclusions. Since the union
had breached the provisions in the contract for departmental seniority,8 3
8o. See N. Y. Times, March 2, 1939, p. I,col. 6.
81. N. L. R. B. v. Sands Mfg. Co., 59 Sup. Ct. 508 (1939), aff'g 96 F. (2d) 721
(C. C. A. 6th, 1938) ; N. L. R. B. v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 96 F. (2d)
948 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938). Although the lower court in the Columbian case had set
aside the Board order of reinstatement on the ground that after the breach of contract
the strikers were no longer employees, the Supreme Court disregarded the contract
aspect of the case. Instead, the Court seems to have affirmed the nullification of the
Board order simply on the score that the employer had not committed any unfair labor
practice and therefore the order was without foundation.
82. 59 Sup. Ct. 5o8 (1939).
83. The following are the pertinent paragraphs of the contract: "(5) . . . when
employees are laid off, seniority rights shall rule, and by departnents.
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the company was considered to be justified in closing the factory and was
under no duty to bargain with the "striking employees" except at their
request. The refusal of the men to work under the terms of the contract
allowed the employer to enter an agreement with another union and hire
new men in lieu of the old. Though a request to bargain was made immediately thereafter, it was too late to be of consequence; therefore, said the
Court, the employer could not be adjudged guilty of violating Section 8 (5)
for the strikers were no longer in his hire. Where, however, the Board
has found the employer guilty of an unfair labor practice, it may be argued
that the abrogation of the contract is not to be considered, but rather that
under Section 2 (3)the employees are "striking employees" and therefore
the Board should be allowed to apply Section io (c) and order reinstatement.84 Because the Act is designed to forestall unfair treatment by the
employer, it does not appear that this line of reasoning is prejudicial to
him; for he has himself violated a rule of conduct, one supported by a strong
public policy.
CONCLUSION
at the activities of the National Labor
leveled
Despite the criticism
Relations Board since its very inception, its orders have withstood the
test of judicial review surprisingly well for so young an administrative
tribunal. The Supreme Court has upheld on practically each point at
issue all but three Board orders which it has reviewed; moreover, it has
abandoned previous tenets in an effort to preserve the National Labor Relations Act in its entirety. It is enough that an employer's unfair labor practices burden and obstruct interstate commerce to bring him within the purview of the Act; and while the early Supreme Court opinions reviewing
the question of jurisdiction were unusually sympathetic, later ones have
gone even further in support of the Board so that it may be anticipated
employers in the future will be less prone to assail the jurisdiction of the
Board. On the other hand, the finality of the Board's findings is being
subjected to a steady attack, the more recent cases disclosing greater vigilance on the part of courts reviewing them. But the judiciary has followed established practice and uniformly maintained that Board findings
are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. The Board has not
been restricted simply to enjoining conduct illegal under the Act, for the
courts have come to sanction mandates compelling affirmative action by
the employer whenever the policies of the Act would be effectuated thereby.
5
However, the three most recent decisions s of the Supreme Court, being
the first complete reversals of the Board by the tribunal, have added
impetus to the drive by both employer groups and the American Federa88
to minimize possibilities of
tion of Labor to have the Act amended
modification of the Act
some
point,
this
at
and,
alleged maladministration;
appears imminent.

M.H. S.

(6) . . . when one department is shut down, men from this department will not
be transferred or work in other departments until all old men only within that department, who were laid off, have been called back." Id. at 511.
84. See dissenting opinion, N. L. R. B.v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co.,
96 F. (2d) 948, 954 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938).
85. N. L. R. B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 59 Sup. Ct. 490 (1939) ; N. L. R.
B. v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 59 Sup. Ct. 501 (1939); N. L. R. B. v.
Sands Mfg. Co., 59 Sup. Ct. 508 (939).

86. Bills sponsored by the American Federation of Labor designed to amend the
National Labor Relations Act have already been introduced in both houses of Congress. See 3 L. R. REP. 673 (1939), 4 L. R. REP. 48 (939).
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Landlord's Tort Liability to Tenant for Injuries Caused by
Negligence of Independent Contractor

When a landlord desires to make repairs or alterations on his premises,
it is often necessary to entrust the performance of the work to an independent contractor. Frequently the contractor is financially irresponsible,
and, as a result, a tenant whose property has been damaged or who has
suffered personal injury due to faulty work by the contractor must either
recover from the landlord or else be without remedy. The opinions handed
down in cases involving the landlord's liability to the tenant contain much
conflicting language, and commentators have figuratively thrown up their
hands in dismay at the confusion in this field of tort law.1 It is submitted
that the confusion is more apparent than real. Basically it would seem
that the difficulties of the courts and of the commentators are to a large
extent traceable to a failure to stress the importance of the character of
that part of the premises upon which the work was done. 2 The duty of
the landlord varies, depending on the character of the place where the
repairs or alterations are being made, and the basic issues have been confused by the failure of the courts to emphasize the scope of the duty in
each particular case. It is not to be understood that all of the cases can
be reconciled when viewed in the light of these distinctions, but it will be
seen that many of the cases containing conflicting language and apparently
reaching contrary results can be explained on this basis.
A short summary of the general law relating to employers of independent contractors is essential to an understanding of the specific application of that law to the landlord-tenant situation. Subject to exceptions
later to be noted, the universally recognized dogma is to the effect that the
employer of an independent contractor is not vicariously liable for injuries
resulting from the latter's negligence.3 The courts have felt that it would
be unjust to impose upon the employer the burden of damages for injuries
caused by unskillful performance since he has no control over the manner
in which the work is done. 4 In certain situations, however, the presence
of other factors and policies induce the courts to impose liability upon the
employer, and a large number of exceptions to the general rule have developed, so much so that it has been said that "the rule is now primarily
important as a preamble to the catalog of its exceptions." - Many of the
so-called exceptions involve situations where the employer is actually held
liable for his own wrong, and are therefore not genuine exceptions. Thus,
the employer is liable if he has directed or controlled the work causing the
injury,6 or if the work necessarily involves the commission of a trespass
or a nuisance, 7 the employer thereby becoming a joint tortfeasor. For
purposes of this discussion the most important of the exceptions concerns
the situation where a person under an affirmative duty imposed by law to
do certain work entrusts its performance to an independent contractor.
i. See Note (1924) 29 A. L. R. 736, 766, where the annotator states that the cases
"are so conflicting, and turn upon such diverse considerations, that it is impossible to
formulate any general rules upon the subject." See also I TIFFANY ON LANDLORD AND
TENANT (i9io) 6II.
2. Tiffany fails to make any distinction on this basis in his discussion of the topic.
I TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note I, § 87 (4).
3. RESTATEIENT, TORTS (1934) § 409.
4. HARPER, TORTS (933) 644; MECHEM, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 1917.
5. See Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. Kenny Boiler & Mfg. Co., 201 Minn. 5oo/503, 277
N. W. 226, 228 (1937).
6. HmRER, op. Cit. supra note 4, at 645; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 410.
7. MECHEMi, op. Cit. supra note 4, § 1918.
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If the contractor does the work negligently and a person to whom the employer owed the duty is injured, the employer is held liable." This is usually treated as an exception to the general rule,9 but in many of the cases
it would appear to be more accurate to regard the liability as based on a
breach of an affirmative, non-delegable duty by the employer. True, the
duty of the employer would have been properly performed if the contractor
had not been negligent, but the liability arises out of the breach of duty
by the employer nevertheless. A true exception to the general rule imposes
liability on the employer for the negligence of his contractor if the work
delegated is inherently or intrinsically dangerous.' 0 This by no means
exhausts the list of exceptions, but the others need not be mentioned since
they are unimportant for the purposes of this discussion. The application
of these general rules of law to the specific situation where a landlord is the
employer and a tenant or his guest is the party injured must now be
considered.
I. WORK DONE ON PART OF PREMISES USED IN COMMON BY ALL TENANTS
Frequently the lessor of a tenement or apartment house employs an
independent contractor to repair or alter common passageways or other
portions of the premises which are not demised by the landlord, but which
he furnishes for the common use of the tenants. As to these parts of the
premises, the landlord owes a duty to his tenants, and to others on the
land with the consent of the tenants, to use reasonable efforts to rectify
dangerous conditions of which he has knowledge or which he could have
discovered by the exercise of reasonable care." The duty owed to the
tenant arises out of the landlord-tenant relationship; that owed to guests
of the tenant arises out of the relationship existing between the owner of
land and 12an invitee. Both are created by law and therefore cannot be
delegated.
Thus, where the landlord has discovered that common stairways or
passageways are in a state of disrepair, and the contractor employed to
repair the defect negligently fails to make the condition safe, the landlord
is liable to a tenant or his guest who is thereafter injured.' 3 This liability
is not predicated on the negligence of the contractor, but on the landlord's
own breach of duty in failing to make safe a dangerous condition after
having knowledge thereof.14 For the same reason there would doubtless
8. The best-known expression of this principle is that of Lord Blackburn in Dalton
v. Angus, 6 App. Cas. 740, 829 (1881) : "A person causing something to be done, the

doing of which casts on him a duty, cannot escape from the responsibility attaching on
him of seeing that duty performed by delegating it to a contractor."
9.See HAmpER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 647; WnARTON, AGENCY (1876) § 485.
io. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 427; Note (1923) 23 A. L. R. 1O84, o85.
Contra: Silveus v. Grossman, 307 Pa.

272, 161
1I. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (1934) § 360.
12. As was noted above.

Atl. 362 (1932).

13. Koskoff v. Goldman, 86 Conn. 415, 85 At. 588 (1912); Brennan v. Ellis, 70

Hun 472, 24 N. Y. Supp. 426 (Sup. Ct. 1893) ; Bryant v. Carr, 52 Misc. 155, IOI N. Y.

Supp. 646 (Sup. Ct. i9o6) ; Lebright v. Gentzlinger,

232

App. Div.

274, 249

N. Y. Supp.

50, (ISt Dep't, 1931) ; see Hussey v. Long Dock R. R., ioo N. J. L. 380, 384, 126 Atl.
314, 315 (1924).

14. An excellent statement of the view that liability should be imposed only where
there has been a breach of duty on the part of the landlord is in the opinion in Cramblitt v. Percival-Porter Co., 176 Iowa 733, 739, 158 N. W. 541, 543 (1916) : "The landlord is not liable for the negligence of this independent contractor and its workmen in
leaving this hole in the floor. The negligence, if any, of the landlord, must be traced

to the violation of that duty which she owed to the tenant to keep this landing in a reasonably safe condition for the use of all the tenants. If it did,

in fact,

become in an un-

safe condition, with the knowledge of the landlord, even though this condition grew
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be liability if the contractor created a dangerous condition in the course
of making alterations and the landlord had actual notice of the defect before
the accident occurred. 15 Some alterations made by a landlord are of such
a nature that he ought to know that during the course of the work a
dangerous condition will be created. Having reason to know of the condition, he is under a duty to render it safe for his tenant, either by giving
warning or by taking other appropriate precautions. If he fails to perform
this duty, he will be liable for resulting injuries. Work which necessarily
involves tearing up boards in the floor,' 8 putting slippery substances on the
floor,"1 or making excavations on part of the property used in common by
all the tenants 1s comes within this classification, and in all of these situations liability has been imposed on the landlord. It would seem that if
the landlord neither knows nor has reason to know of the existence of the
danger, he should not be liable, since his duty to repair has not arisen.
Frequently the courts, when confronted with this situation, fail to
define the scope of the duty, and speak primarily in terms of vicarious
liability.' 9 This results in a misconception of the problem which is responsible for much of the confusion appertaining to the subject. Two cases
furnish excellent illustrations of this point. In Blake v. Fox 20 a child of
one of the tenants was injured when a rope on a dumb waiter, used by all
the tenants, parted. Some time before, a contractor employed by the landlord had made alterations on the dumb waiter, and it was the contractor's
negligence in splicing an additional length of rope to the old rope that led
to the injury. The court held that the landlord was liable, stating that it
was immaterial whether or not he had notice of the defective performance
of the work, since his liability for the negligent performance by the contractor was absolute. When considered in the light of the landlord's duty,
it is clear that the result is unsound if the landlord had no reason to know
of the dangerous condition.
In Louthan v.Hewes 21 the plaintiff had attended services in a hall
leased by defendant to a church society. While descending a stairway used
in common by all occupants of the building, plaintiff tripped over boards
nailed to the stairs for protective purposes by a contractor employed by
defendant to construct the stairs. The court refused to allow recovery for
injuries thereby sustained on the ground that the doctrine of respondeat
out of the negligence of the independent contractor, and the landlord permitted it to
remain so, and thereby exposed her tenants to danger, the landlord violated her duty,
and to this, her liability, if any, is traceable."
15. No cases have been found which involve this exact situation. Possibly the case
of Dorse v. Fisher, io Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 163 can be explained on this basis, although
it is not clear that the landlord had knowledge of the dangerous condition.
16. Horn v. Danzinger, NO Misc. 341, i8o N. Y. Supp. 96 (Sup. Ct. 192o) ; Sallan
v. Brindsley Realty Co., 247 App. Div. 382, 287 N. Y. Supp. 383 (ist Dep't, 1936) ; cf.
Russo v. Watson, 249 App. Div. 782, 292 N. Y. Supp. 249 (2d Dep't, 1936).
17. Ward v. Broadway Marlboro Realty Corp., 137 Misc. 71, 241 N. Y. Supp. 472
(N. Y. City Cts. 1930).
x8. Curtis v. Kiley, 153 Mass. 123, 26 N. E. 421 (i89i) ; Robbins v. Atkins, 168
Mass. 45, 46 N. E. 425 (1897) ; see Wallich v. Great West Construction Co., 24 Man.

642, 646, 20 Dona. L. R. 553, 556 (1914) (trap-door in hall left open).
ig. In Horn v. Danzinger, IO Misc. 341, 343, i8o N. Y. Supp. 96 (Sup. Ct. 192o)
the court states: "This duty they cannot delegate or avoid, and if they select others to
do the work they are liable for their negligence whether they be servants or independent
contractors." (Italics supplied.) For similar statement see Koskoff v. Goldman, 86
Conn. 415, 42o, 85 AtI. 588, 591 (1912) ; Gobrecht v. Beckwith, 82 N. H. 415, 42o, 135
Atl. 20, 22 (1926) ; Sciolaro v. Asch, 198 N. Y. 77, 8I, 91 N. E. 263, 264 (191o) ; Russo
v. Watson, 249 App. Div. 782, 292 N. Y. Supp. 249 (2d Dep't, 1936).
20. 17 N. Y. Supp. 5o8 (C. P. 1892).
21. 138 Cal. 116, 70 Pac. 1O65 (1902).
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superior did not apply, since the repairs were made by an independent con-

tractor. The court thought that the only problem was whether there could
be vicarious liability. There was no consideration whatsoever of the duty
devolving upon the landlord by virtue of his control of the hall. It is submitted that the landlord had reason to know that the dangerous condition
would be created, and therefore was guilty of a breach of duty in failing
to make that condition safe for his tenants and their guests. These two
cases are dearly out of line with the weight of authority on this particular
problem. In each instance there was a complete misunderstanding of the
basic problem involved.
When the injury to the tenant results from what is usually termed
collateral negligence, an entirely different problem is presented. Collateral
negligence has been defined as negligence in the performance of the work
"which does not make the result fall short of that which it would be the
employer's duty to attain, had he done the work himself." 22 In Hyman v.
Barrett2 3 an employee of a contractor, employed by the landlord to install
a pipe in a tenement house, dislodged a board that had been placed across
a window sill, causing it to fall into a courtyard used by all the tenants. A
tenant who was struck by the board and injured was denied recovery against
the landlord on the ground that the injury was caused by negligence collateral to the work and not by the performance of the work itself. Judge
Cardozo in rendering the opinion emphasized the fact that the landlord was
under a duty to use reasonable care to keep the courtyard safe and that a
failure to perform this duty would subject him to liability if it was the
proximate cause of the injury.24 However, in this case "the place was not
unsafe because a contractor was installing a pipe". 25 The injury was not
attributable to any breach of duty by the landlord, but was caused entirely
by the negligence of the contractor's employee for which the contractor
alone was liable under the general rule. The tenant, therefore, had no
remedy against the landlord.
A similar rule has been applied to situations where a tenant has been
injured because of the negligence of a contractor in leaving large objects
upon the premises, 26 or loose stones; 2 7 in spilling paint upon a common
stairway; 28 in leaving open a trap-door over a cellarway.2 9 Clearly such
acts of negligence did not make the work fall short of that which the landlord was obliged to accomplish. In such cases the premises are unquestionably in a dangerous condition, but the important factor to be noted is that
the landlord's duty to abate the danger arises only if he could have discovered it by the exercise of reasonable care. 0 Since the work involved
does not ordinarily result in the creation of dangers of this type, and since
22. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (1934)
23. 224 N. Y. 436, 121 N. E. 271
24. Id. at 437, 121 N. E. at 272.

§ 426, comment a.
(ig18).

25. Id. at 438, 121 N. E. at 272.
26. Mahon v. Burms, 9 Misc. 223, 29 N. Y. Supp. 682 (N. Y. City Cts. 1894) ; Boss
v. Jarmulowsky, 8I App. Div. 577, 81 N. Y. Supp. 4oo (1st Dep't, i9o3).
27. Harmony Realty Co. v. Underwood, 118 Ohio St. 576, 16I N. E. 924 (1928).
28. Rudger v. Mucklon Holding Co., 240 App. Div. 188, 269 N. Y. Supp. 723 (Ist
Dep't, 1934).
29. Burns v. McDonald, 57 Mo. App. 599 (i894).

3o. "It is the duty of an owner to use reasonable care in keeping the stairways and
hallways, used in common by his tenants, in suitable condition for safe passage; but
there is no violation of that duty until he knows or ought to have known that they are

in a dangerous condition." Boss v. Jarmulowsky, 81 App. Div. 577, 581, 8i N. Y. Supp.

400, 402 (1st Dep't, 19o3).
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the landlord is not required to foresee that the contractor will negligently
create such a condition,"' the landlord is not obliged to take precautions
against injury from such a source until he obtains knowledge of the danger
or until sufficient time has elapsed so that knowledge will be attributed to
him.3 2 Failing this, there is no breach of duty, and no recovery can be had
against the landlord.3 3 However, if the landlord has reason to know of
the condition and fails
to remove the danger, he is liable to a tenant who
34

is thereafter injured.
Before leaving this section, mention must be made of cases involving

injury to a tenant from the negligent operation of elevators controlled by

a landlord, but operated by an independent contractor.

It has been held

that the landlord owes his tenants a duty to see that reasonable care is
exercised in operating the elevators; that this duty cannot be delegated;
and that therefore the landlord is liable.3 5

II. DAMAGE TO PROPERTY ON LEASED PREMISES CAUSED BY WORK DONE
ON ADJOINING PREMISES

At times the landlord employs a contractor to make repairs, alterations
or improvements upon part of the premises not demised or upon adjoining
premises owned by the landlord, and negligent performance results in damage to a tenant's property or, in rare instances, causes physical injury to
the tenant while he is upon the premises leased to him. An early case
denies liability where the damage was caused by a dangerous condition
created by the contractor, 6 but the modern trend appears to be in the other
direction, and correctly so. Basically, it would seem that the liability of
the landlord in such cases is in no way dependent upon the landlord-tenant
relationship, although the courts frequently make this the determining factor. The duty owed by the landlord in this instance is that which a possessor of land owes to the possessor of adjoining land. He is obliged to
31. "The defendant had no notice of the danger. He had not authorized any work
which might reasonably be expected to create danger. We think he is not liable for the
act of the contractor's servant." Cardozo, J., in Hyman v. Barrett, 224 N. Y. 436, 439,
121 N. E. 271, 272 (1918).

32. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that such a length of time had
elapsed to charge the landlord with knowledge. See Boss v. Jarmulowsky, 81 App.
Div. 577, 581, 81 N. Y. Supp. 400, 402 (ist Dep't, 19o3).
33. In Rosenburg v. Zeitchik, 52 Misc. 153, IOI N. Y. Supp. 591 (Sup. Ct. 19o6)
a plumber employed to repair defective plumbing (on part of premises controlled by
landlord) left a charcoal furnace in a tenant's shop. The tenant's child was injured by
the furnace, and the landlord was held liable although there was no evidence that he
knew of the danger. This case would appear to be directly opposed to the overwhelming majority of cases. In Hicks v. Smith, 158 App. Div. 299 (3d Dep't, 1913) (mortar
and materials left in a common hallway), the landlord was held liable although it did
not appear that he had any way of knowing of the dangerous condition. The case may
perhaps be explained on the ground that the landlord had been personally negligent in
failing to light the hall.
34. Wilber v. Follansbee, 97 Wis. 577, 72 N. W. 741 (1897) (rubbish in hallway).
In this case the jury specifically found that the landlord either knew of the dangerous
condition or could have discovered it by the exercise of reasonable care.
35. Sciolaro v. Asch, 198 N. Y. 77, 91 N. E. 263 (1gio) ; see Bessner v. Central
Trust Co., 23o N. Y. 357, 361, 13o N. E. 577, 578 (1921).
36. Lawrence v. Shipman, 39 Conn. 586 (1873), the court basing its decision on the
general rule of non-liability for the misconduct of an independent contractor; cf. Glickauf v. Maurer, 75 IIl. 289 (1874) which imposed liability on the ground that there had
not been a complete surrender of possession of the premises to the contractor, and that
therefore he must be considered as a servant. By implication the court would have
denied recovery if the contractor had been given complete control. The English law
appears to be in accord with the Lawrence case. Blake v. Woolf [1898] 2 Q. B. 426;
cf. Wolfson v. Forrester (191o) Sess. Cas. 675, 47 Scot. L. R. 525.
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use reasonable care to protect a possessor of adjoining land from unreasonable risks from disrepair and dangerous artificial conditions on his premises.3 7 Being an affirmative duty, created by law, it cannot be delegated.
In Van Dam v. Doly-Salisbury Co. 38 it was held that the formation of
ice on top of a water tank located in a common courtyard created a dangerous condition which the landlord was under an absolute obligation to correct. Therefore the employment of an independent contractor, who made
the repairs negligently so that the danger was not abated, did not operate to
relieve the landlord of liability for damage to goods on the tenant's premises
caused by water which escaped when the tank collapsed. The failure to
make safe the dangerous condition constituted a breach of duty owed to
the tenant.8 9 It appears that the courts have raised the same duty on the
part of the landlord to protect tenant A from injury where he (the landlord) authorizes the erection of structures upon the premises of tenant B,40
or introduces dangerous substances into premises leased to tenant B. 41
Logically, this duty should arise only when the landlord knows or has reason to know that activities on the land of tenant B have created conditions dangerous to the person or property of tenant A. 42
As regards activities on the land involving unreasonable risk of harm
to those on adjoining premises, a different rule prevails. The duty of the
possessor of land not to engage in such activities in no way differs from
the duty when he is upon "neutral ground". 4 This obligation being negative in character, rather than affirmative, 44 is not one of the duties which
are held to be incapable of delegation. Therefore, when the negligent activities of an independent contractor, who is authorized by a landlord to
make repairs or alterations on part of the premises reserved for his own
use, cause injury to the person or property of a tenant, the landlord is not
liable.4 5 Nor is the landlord liable if the contractor engages in such activities while working on the adjoining premises of another tenant under
37. HARPER, op. cit. supra note 4, at

209;

cf.

RESTATEMENT,

TORTS (1934)

365.

§ 364,

38. 218 Mich. 32, 187 N. W. 285 (1922).
39. However the court spoke of the landlord's liability for the contractor's negligent
acts. Id. at 37, 187 N. W. at 287.
40. Blickley v. Luce, 148 Mich. 223, 1ii N. W. 752 (i9o7) ; Myre v. Schlender, 98
Minn. 234, io8 N. W. 276 (1go6). In the former case the decision was partially based
on the theory that there had been an eviction of the tenant and a consequent breach of
the covenant of quiet enjoyment.
41. Medley v. Trenton Investment Co., 2o5 Wis. 30, 236 N. W. 713 (93).

42. In the cases cited supra note 4o, it is not clear whether the landlord had knowledge that a dangerous condition had been created. In the Medley case the landlord
had no knowledge that a dangerous gas was to be introduced into the appartment of
tenant B, but the court felt that he would have known of it if he had exercised reasonable care.
43. RESTAT MENT, TORTS (934) § 373.
44. HARPm, op. cit. supra note 4, at 209, 210.
45. Mintz v. White, 269 Mass. 218, 169 N. E. 138 (i929); Rotter v. Goerlitz, i6
Daly 484, 12 N. Y. Supp. 210 (C. P. 1891) ; Hyde v. Wilmore, I4 Misc. 340, 35 N. Y.

Supp. 68I (C. P. 1895). But cf. Paltey v. Egan, 2oo N. Y. 83, 93 N. E. 267 (I9IO).
The recent case of Rosen v. Prudent Estates, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 525 (App. Div., 2d
Dep't, 1938) may also be opposed to this proposition.

From the brief memorandum

opinion it is not clear whether the negligence of the contractor involved the negligent
repair of a dangerous condition (broken leader) or a negligent activity (negligent

handling of hot tar). The latter conclusion is more likely to be correct since the court
states that the work was inherently dangerous. In the last analysis, however, the decision does not appear to be based on the "inherently dangerous" exception to the general rule of non-liability.
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authorization from the landlord. 46 In neither case has the landlord violated
a duty owed to his tenant, and for the negligence of his contractor he is
not liable under the general rule. This principle is subject to the qualification that the landlord will be liable if one of the aforementioned 47 exceptions to the general rule is applicable. Thus, there is liability if the damage
was caused by the very acts that the landlord directed the contractor to do. 48
III. WoRK DONE ON LEASED PREMISES
The greatest number of cases arise from the negligent performance of
work by an independent contractor upon premises leased to a tenant. A
few of the cases come within well-recognized exceptions to the general
rule applicable to all employers of independent contractors, and in such cases
there is no conflict. Thus, if the landlord sends a contractor to do work
upon the premises of his tenant without obtaining the latter's consent, he
has cooperated in the commission of a trespass, and is liable to the tenant
for all consequential damages, including those caused by the negligence of
the contractor.49 If the contractor's negligent work is done pursuant to the
directions of the landlord, the latter is liable just as though he himself had
act.50 Presumably, the other exceptions would be equally
done the negligent
51
applicable.

46. Fitzgerald v. Timoney, 13 Misc. 327, 34 N. Y. Supp. 46o (N. Y. City Cts.
1895). But cf. Robinson v. Cruikshank Holding Corp., 247 App. Div. 881, 287 N. Y.
Supp. 227 (Ist Dep't, 1936) (two judges dissenting).
47. See supra p. 728.
48. Alexis v. Pittinger, i i Wash. 626, 206 Pac. 370 (1922). Another so-called
exception to the general rule results in the imposition of liability upon the employer of
an independent contractor if the work is of such a nature that it will necessarily cause
harm unless precautions are taken. The leading case on this point is Bower v. Peate,
I Q. B. D. 321 (1876). This exception is applicable to the particular phase of the
landlord-tenant situation now being considered. Odell v. Cleveland House Ltd., 102
L. T. R. 6o2 (K. B. D. igio). See Mintz v. White, 269 Mass. 218, 221, 169 N. E. 138,
139 (1929). The law is by no means settled as to what constitutes work which will
necessarily cause injury unless precautions are taken, see Note (923)
23 A. L. R.
iO16, or as to what constitutes inherently dangerous work, see Note (1923) 23 A. L.
R. lo84. The fact that the employer of the contractor happens to be a landlord does
not change the application of these principles, see (1938) 18 B. U. L. Rzv. 458, 461,
and it is not within the scope of this Note to consider the problem of when these exceptions should be applied.
49. Northern Trust Co. v. Palmer, 171 Ill. 383, 49 N. E. 553 (1898); Galber v.
Grossberg, 324 Mo. 742, 25 S. W. (2d) 96 (193o); Doyle v. Franck, 82 Neb. 6o6, 118
N. W. 468 (19o8) ; see i TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note i, at 61I. It will be noted that
the Doyle decision was based on the theory that the landlord had breached an absolute,
non-delegable duty which obligated him not to do anything which would render the
premises unsafe for his tenant. Compare with these cases McDermott v. McDaneld,
55 Ill. App. 226 (1894), where it was held that a member of the tenant's family, who
suffered personal injury due to the negligence of the trespassing contractor in leaving
a cornice upon the premises, cannot recover from the landlord since the trespass is a
wrong only to the tenant, and consequently a member of his family cannot recover on
this theory. This would seem to be the proper interpretation of this case although it
has been stated that the court was making a distinction between property damage and
personal injury, see (1938) 18 B. U. L. REV. 458, 464.
5o. Aldag v. Ott, 28 Ind. App. 542, 63 N. E. 48o (19o2) ; Ruff Drug Co. v. Western Iowa Co., 191 Iowa 1035 (ig2) ; Lasch v. Cohn, 130 Pa. Super. I61, 196 Atl. 58I
(1938) ; see I TiFFANY, op. cit. supra note i, at 6x4.
51. Many of the cases involving the factual situation discussed in this section concern the re-roofing of the leased premises by the contractor. A few of the courts have
held that this comes within the exception, mentioned supra note 48, whereby the landlord is liable if the work will necessarily cause harm to the tenant unless precautions
are taken. Nahm & Friedman v. Register Newspaper Co., 12o Ky. 485, 87 S. W. 296
(1905) ; Eberson v. Continental Investment Co., 130 Mo. App. 296, lO9 S. W. 62
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In a great majority of cases arising under this section, none of these
exceptional factors are present. With the consent of the tenant, often at
his express request, the landlord employs a contractor to repair, alter or
improve the leased property. Sometimes this undertaking on the part of
the landlord is purely gratuitous, and is done entirely for the accommodation of the tenant. In this situation it is clear that the landlord will not be
liable for the negligent failure of a contractor to do the work.5 2 On the
other hand, if the contractor actually does the work, and does it negligently
so that a tenant is thereby injured, there is an almost even division of
authority on the question of whether the landlord is liable. Approximately
half the jurisdictions that have considered the problem have refused to permit recovery, holding that the general rule of non-liability of an employer
for harm resulting from the misconduct of an independent contractor is
58
applicable.
The Illinois Supreme Court in Jefferson v. Jameson & Morse
Co. 14 clearly expressed the view of this line of authority when it stated:
"The fact that appellee was a tenant of appellant, occupying the building
where the repairs were made, does not, in our opinion, make this case an
exception to the general rule. . . . Having agreed that the repairs might
be made it occupies no better position, so far as its right to recover damages is concerned, than a stranger." The cases which take the opposing
view impose liability because it is felt that the existence of the landlordtenant relationship should alter the general rule so that the landlord will be
vicariously liable for his contractor's negligence.5 A few of these cases
seem to have created an affirmative duty on the part of the landlord to make
sure that the tenant shall not suffer property damage or personal injury due
to negligent performance of the work.56
When a landlord undertakes to make repairs or alterations upon part
of the leased premises without being obliged in any way to do so, he has
no duty to see that the premises are put in a safe condition. His sole
obligation is not to put his tenant in a worse position than before the work
(i9o8); Honneymeyer v. Fischer, 27 Ohio C. C. 8 (igoS); Wertheimer v. Saunders,
95 Wis. 573, 7o N. W. 824 (1897). In order to reach this result it has been necessary
to broaden the exception so as to impose liability if the landlord could reasonablyanticipate that harm might result, and the majority of cases do not classify the situation under the exception in question. Bains v. Dank, 199 Ala. 250, 74 So. 341 (1917) ; Ryce
v. Whitley, 115 Iowa 784, 87 N. W. 694 (19ol) ; Malony v. Brady, i4 N. Y. Supp. 794
(C. P. 1891); O'Rourke v. Feist, 42 App. Div. 136, 59 N. Y. Supp. 157 (ist Dep't,

1899) ; Dalkowitz Bros. v. Schreiner, 11o S. W. 564 (Tex. Civ. App. i9o8). Only in
the Bains case was recovery denied, however.
52. Vollkommer v. Menge, 116 N. J. L. 82, 182 Atl. 347 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
53. Bains v. Dank, ig Ala. 250, 74 So. 341 (1917) ; Jefferson v. Jameson & Morse

Co., 165 Ill. 138, 46 N. E. 272 (1896) ; Eblin v. Miller, 78 Ky. 371 (i88o) ; Schatzky v.

Harber, 164 N. Y. Supp. 61o (Sup. Ct. 1917); Charles G. Robin, Inc. v. Winslow, 171
XT. Y. Supp. 55 (Sup. Ct. 1918) ; Firestone v. Schoenberger, 28 Ohio N. P. 436 (C. P.
193i) ; Meany v. Abbott, 6 Phila. 256 (Pa. 1867) ; Mills v. Holton, 2 H. & N. 14 (Ex.
1857); see Noggle Wholesale & Mfg. Co. v. Sellers & Marquis R. Co., 183 S. W. 659,
662 (Mo. App. 1916) ; Connick v. John F. Craig, Inc., 8 N. J. L. 234, 235, 149 Atl. 538,
539 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
54. 165 Ill. 138, 142, 46 N. E. 272, 273 (I896).
55. Ryce v. Whitley, 115 Iowa 784, 87 N. W. 694 (igoi); Malony v. Brady, 14
X. Y. Supp. 794 (C. P. 189i); Dalkowitz v. Schreiner, I1O S. W. 564 (Tex. Civ. App.
i9o8) ; see Michael & Bro. v. Billings Printing Co., 15o Ky. 253, 256, 150 S. W. 77,
79 (i912) ; Lasker Real Estate Ass'n v. Hatcher, 28 S. W. 404 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894) ;
ef. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (934) § 420.
56. O'Rourke v. Feist, 42 App. Div. 136, 59 N. Y. Supp. 157 (Ist Dep't, 1899) ;
Bancroft v. Godwin, 41 Wash. 253, 83 Pac. 189 (igo5) ; see Vollrath v. Stevens, 199
Mo. App. 5, 13, 202 S. W. 283, 286 (I918).
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was done.5 7 It should be clearly understood that the duty is negative in
character. It is an obligation not to do acts which will make an unsafe
condition more dangerous, or which will create a trap for the tenant by
giving the premises a false appearance of safety. 8 Being a negative duty,
it does not come under the usual classification of non-delegable duties.
Where, as in the cases here involved, the negligence of the contractor has
created a new or more dangerous defect, the landlord has not committed
a breach of duty. The contractor is the only party who has been at fault.
It is clear therefore that the jurisdictions which impose liability in this
situation are doing one of two things. Either they are imposing a new,
affirmative duty upon the landlord when he entrusts the work to a contractor; or they are holding the landlord vicariously liable. The latter
seems to be the more logical theory. The extension of the liability of the
employer of an independent contractor in this instance is purely a creature
of landlord-tenant law, and is not explicable on any other basis.
Only a few cases have arisen when the independent contractor was
employed to make repairs to satisfy the landlord's contractual obligation to
repair growing out of a covenant in the lease. In each case the tenant has
been allowed to recover for injuries caused by the contractor's negligence. 59
Liability has likewise been imposed where the work was done in pursuance
of an agreement providing that the landlord would make alterations on the
premises in consideration of increased rentals.60 Strictly speaking, the contract to repair should not alter the situation, since the great majority of
jurisdictions hold that a covenant to repair creates no duty the violation
of which will result in the imposition of liability upon the landlord.61 Here
again, it is evident that the courts are going beyond strict agency principles,
and are imposing vicarious liability because of the existence of the landlordtenant relationship. The covenant to repair is an additional factor motivating the courts to place the burden on the landlord, thus explaining the
unanimity of opinion in cases where a covenant in the lease or a contract
apart from the lease can be found.
57. Bohlen, Landlord and Tenant (1922) 35 HA v. L. REv. 633, 651.
58. Harkrider, Tort Liability of a Landlord (1928) 26 MicH. L. REv. 383, 407-8.
59. Clark v. Engelhardt, 9 La. App. 334, I2O So. 498 (1928), criticized in (1929)
78 U. OF PA. L. REwv. ii; Peerless Mfg. Co. v. Bagley, 126 Mich. =5, 85 N. W. 568
(igoi) ; Eberson v. Continental Investment Co., 118 Mo. App. 67, 93 S. W. 297 (19o6)
with which compare Eberson v. Continental Investment Co., 130 Mo. App. 296, 307, 109
S. W. 62, 66 (io8) ; Blumenthal v. Prescott, 7o App. Div. 56o, 75 N. Y. Supp. 710
(Ist Dep't, 19o2) ; see Lasker Real Estate Ass'n v. Hatcher, 28 S. W. 404 (Tex. Civ.

App. 1894); Mills v. Holton, 2 H. & N. 14, 18 (Ex. 1857); RE-STATEMENT, TORTs
(Q934) § 419; cf. Wagner v. Willing, 84 N. Y. Supp. 979 (Sup. Ct. 1903). Contra:
I TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note i, at 612.
6o. Vitale v. Duerbeck, 332 Mo. 1184, 62 S. W. (2d) 559 (1933) (tenant allowed
to recover), same case on subsequent appeal, 338 Mo. 556, 92 S. W. (2d) 691 (1935) ;
Bloecher v. Duerbeck, 333 Mo. 359, 62 S. W. (2d) 553 (1933) (guest of tenant allowed
to recover), same case on subsequent appeal, 338 Mo. 535, 92 S. W. (2d) 68I (1935);
cf. Covington Co. v. Masonic Temple Co., 176 Ky. 729, 197 S. W. 420 (1917).
61. See Notes (192o) 8 A. L. R. 765, 766, (193o) 68 A. L. R. 1194, 1195. A growing minority of states impose what is apparently a duty to use reasonable care to maintain the premises in a safe condition when there is a covenant to repair, and therefore
hold the landlord liable for injuries caused by a failure to repair. See RESTATEmENT,
TORTs (934) §357; Notes (1920) 8 A. L. R. 765, 772, (1930) 68 A. L. R. 1194, 1201.
The cases involving an independent contractor cannot be explained in terms of a breach
of such a duty since most of the cases have arisen in jurisdictions which do not recognize this obligation. Kuyk v. Green, 219 Mich. 423, 189 N. W. 25 (1922) ; Turner v.
Ragan, 229 S. W. 809 (Mo. 1921) ; Cullings v. Goetz, 256 N. Y. 287, 176 N. E. 397
(1931). However, Texas has adhered to the minority view, Ross v. Haner, 258 S. W.
1O36 (Tex. Comm. App. 1924).

NOTES

Another situation remains to be considered. Where the landlord employs the contractor to make repairs which he is required by statute to make,
fails to make the premises safe,
the landlord will be liable if the contractor
and the tenant is thereby injured.6 2 The duty imposed by the statute 63 is
non-delegable, and from the breach of that duty by the landlord and the
resulting injury to the tenant, there arises a cause of action for negligence.
One qualification must be made concerning the decisions on this point.
If the misconduct of the contractor is such as has been classified as collateral
negligence, the landlord is not liable whether the repairs or alterations constituted merely a gratuitous undertaking or whether the lessor was obligated
by contract or statute to make them. 4 The principle that the landlord is
not liable when the negligence of the contractor is merely collateral cannot
in this instance be explained by showing that there has been no breach of
duty by the landlord 65 since, as has been seen, in all the cases arising under
this section 6I the landlord has not been at fault. Where liability has been
imposed it has been purely vicarious, and theoretically there is nothing to
prevent the courts from proceeding one step further and imposing vicarious
liability for collateral negligence. All that can be said is that the courts feel
that this would make "the landlord's burden heavy beyond precedent" 67
and they therefore restrict the landlord's liability to situations where the
contractor's negligence has a close relation to the work contracted for.
CONCLUSION

It is apparent that as long as the courts are considering questions
raised by negligent repair work or alterations by an independent contractor upon part of the premises not leased to the injured tenant, their decisions are consistent in imposing liability on the landlord if there has actually been a breach of duty on his part. All too often, however, this basic
problem is not taken into consideration. It is likewise evident that the
cases which deal with the problem raised by the contractor's negligent performance of work upon leased premises are irreconcilably divided. As has
been seen, there is ordinarily no violation of duty by the landlord. Under
general principles governing the liability of employers of independent contractors, there could be recovery only against the contractor. The cases
that impose vicarious liability upon the landlord must be justified, if at all,
on the basis of a public policy which requires that tenants be protected in
this situation. It is probable that certain factors tend to influence the courts
to place the burden upon the lessor. The tenant has no right to intervene
in the selection of the contractor, and must therefore rely on the landlord's
judgment. The landlord is probably in a better position to absorb or spread
the loss, or to protect himself by insuring against the loss. On the other
62. See Selden v. Nixon Realty Corp., 153 Misc. 560, 563, 275 N. Y. Supp. 438, 442
(N. Y. City Cts. 1934), rev'd on other grounds, 155 Misc. 699, 28o N. Y. Supp. 11o

(Sup. Ct. 1935).

63. In any case the specific statute must be examined to determine the scope of the
duty with a view to determining whether there has been a breach of duty.
64. Jackson v. Butler, 249 Mo. 342, 155 S. W. 1071 (1913); Zarillo v. Satz, 118
N. J. L. 576, 194 Atl. 241 (937); Caldwell v. Wildenberg, 228 App. Div. 557, 24o N. Y.
Supp. 280 (ist Dep't, 1930) ; Pora Realty Corp. v. Levine, 166 Misc. 625 (1938), with
which compare Clark v. Engelhardt, 9 La. App. 334, 120 So. 498 (1928), 78 U. OF PA.
L. Rav. "9

65.
66.
67.
(1918),

(1929).

Compare
With the
Cardozo,
speaking

of the note.

supra p. 731.
exception of those involving a statutory duty to repair.
J., in Hyman v. Barrett, 224 N. Y. 436, 437, 121 N. E. 271, 272
with reference to the factual situation dealt with in the first section
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hand, placing the burden upon the landlord will tend either to discourage
investment in the ownership of real estate, or to cause rentals to increase.
In either event, a socially undesirable result is reached.6 9 Furthermore,
imposition of liability in these cases tends to discourage gratuitous undertakings on the part of landlords, thereby reacting in the long run to the
detriment of tenants. The more logical and economically sound policy
would seem to call for a restriction of the liability of the landlord to situations where he has been guilty of a violation of duty to his tenant, except
for cases falling within the few well-recognized exceptions applicable to all
employers of independent contractors.
R.W.S.
68. See Eldredge, Landlord's Tort Liability for Disrepair (i936) 84 U. oF PA. L.
REv. 467, 490, concerning another situation wherein some courts have tended to impose
an increasingly heavy burden upon the landlord.

